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ORDER RESTORED?  FEDERAL AGENCIES “ACCOUNTABLE”
FOR NEPA, ESA VIOLATIONS BUT PROJECT TO PROCEED:
EXAMINING PUB. EMPS. FOR ENVTL.
RESPONSIBILITY V. HOPPER
I. INTRODUCTION
The time for bipartisan and strong government support for en-
vironmental crusades is diminishing.1  The National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) is at the forefront of environmental causes that
receive reduced support, and it continues to face a constant stream
of restrictions and limitations.2  NEPA began with the lofty goal of
eliminating harm to the environment.3  It did not take long, how-
ever, for the limitations on NEPA’s far-reaching effects to begin.4
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club,5 the United States Supreme Court (Supreme
Court) found that a complete NEPA review was only necessary after
“an actual proposal for . . . development[ ]” had occurred.6  Follow-
ing this decision, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment brought the substantive power of NEPA into question.7
Subsequently, the Supreme Court determined that NEPA’s role was
to make an agency consider the possible environmental impact of a
given proposal.8  The Supreme Court, however, quickly clarified
whether NEPA had substantive or procedural power in Robertson v.
1. See Nate Hausman, Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms: Breathing a Sigh of
Equitable Relief, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 155, 156 (2011) (explaining how courts re-
versed support for NEPA).  Beyond the role that the courts have played in shaping
NEPA, many members of Congress have also lessened their support towards envi-
ronmental causes since the peak of support by the Nixon administration. See
Sharon Buccino, NEPA Under Assault: Congressional and Administrative Proposals
Would Weaken Environmental Review and Public Participation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 50,
52 (2003) (detailing Congress’ diminished NEPA support).
2. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 156 (describing challenges NEPA has faced).
3. See id. (citing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ § 4321-70 (West (2012)) (explaining NEPA’s self-proclaimed goals and
purpose).
4. See id. (citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 414-15 (1976)) (describ-
ing case in which United States Supreme Court limited NEPA).
5. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
6. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 156 (footnote omitted) (discussing when
NEPA analyses must occur).
7. See Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 223
(1980) (explaining what court must determine for NEPA).
8. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 156 (citing Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood
Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)) (highlighting how Court de-
clared NEPA procedural).
(207)
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Methow Valley Citizens Council,9 and determined that NEPA did not
have substantive power, thus reducing it to a solely procedural
statute.10
While only procedural, NEPA still had the power to halt a pro-
ject with the same effectiveness as many substantive environmental
acts, such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA).11 Plaintiffs could
obtain some form of injunctive relief after an alleged violation,
which is a way both NEPA and ESA halted projects.12  Statutes, such
as NEPA and the ESA, often resulted in the possible remedies made
available by statutes, even after initial restrictions, and thus, both
were effective.13  Further, no shortage of environmental groups ex-
isted in the eco-defense landscape.14  These environmental groups
often sued federal agencies when the government agencies used
methods that arguably violated NEPA.15  In recent years, however,
many circuit courts, including the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit), provided other
courts greater latitude in determining the appropriate remedy for a
NEPA violation.16  In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission),17 the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia (D.C. District) created the “countervailing considera-
tions” test to balance environmental interests against so-called “pub-
lic interest.”18  The most recent case on this issue, Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility v. Hopper (Hopper),19 exemplifies the
trend of many courts to limit the remedies available when NEPA is
violated in the name of public interests.20  This trend serves as an-
9. 490 U.S. 332 (1989).
10. See id. at 350 (detailing case that found NEPA was procedural).
11. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 158 (showing Ninth Circuit upheld perma-
nent injunction).
12. See Sarah J. Morath, A Mild Winter: The Status of Environmental Preliminary
Injunctions, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 155, 156 (2013) (explaining remedies environ-
mental group plaintiffs seek).
13. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 158 (showing effectiveness of NEPA).
14. Morath, supra note 12, at 156 (describing environmental group
landscape).
15. See id. (explaining how plaintiffs promote NEPA compliance).
16. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n., 606 F.2d 1261, 1273 (D.D.C. 1979) (detailing court change in NEPA
views).
17. Id. at 1272 (introducing countervailing considerations test).
18. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alaska v. Andrus, 580
F.2d 465, 485 (1978)) (explaining court’s use of countervailing considerations
test).
19. 827 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
20. See id. (explaining court’s decision).
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other reminder that NEPA may no longer be the same in terms of
effectiveness.21
This Casenote (Note) examines the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in
Hopper.22  The Hopper court held that a variety of federal agencies
violated the ESA and NEPA by granting leases for the Cape Wind
Project (Cape Wind); Cape Wind was projected to build wind tur-
bines in the ocean off of the coast.23  The court ultimately found
that Cape Wind could proceed after minor adjustments.24  Part I
discusses the trend of declining NEPA effectiveness, which can, in
part, explain the ineffectiveness of NEPA in the Hopper case.25  Part
II provides an overview of the relevant facts of Hopper and its prede-
cessor, Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau (Beaudreau).26
Part III explains the origins and requirements of the relevant acts
and their historical applicability to federal agencies.27  Part IV re-
views the D.C. Circuit’s legal analysis in Hopper and explains the dif-
ferences in reasoning from the D.C. District’s decision in
Beaudreau.28  Part V takes a critical look at the court’s reasoning and
conclusions.29  This discussion focuses on the D.C. Circuit’s deter-
mination that, despite a violation of NEPA, the relevant agency
need not halt construction under the “countervailing considera-
tions” test.30  Rather, the agency need only submit a geological sur-
vey before project construction continues.31  Lastly, Part VI
explores the impact that limiting the remedies under NEPA will
21. See id. (foreshadowing subsequent impacts NEPA limitations create).
22. See id. (detailing court’s opinion in Hopper case).
23. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
85 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining factual background of case).
24. See id. (explaining remedy court gives).
25. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 155-58 (explaining NEPA’s dwindling effec-
tiveness).  For background information on the ineffectiveness of NEPA, see supra
notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
26. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1080-82 (explaining relevant facts of Hopper); see
also Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 85-86.  For a summary of relevant facts to the case,
see infra notes 34-74 and accompanying text.
27. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 81-85 (explaining environmental acts’
background).  For additional background on many of the important environmen-
tal acts discussed in this Note, see infra notes 75-132 and accompanying text.
28. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084-91 (detailing Hopper’s narrative analysis).  For
a more detailed narrative analysis of Hopper, see infra notes 133-190 and accompa-
nying text.
29. See id. (explaining court’s reasoning and conclusion).  For a critical analy-
sis of Hopper, see infra notes 191-237 and accompanying text.
30. See id. (showing court’s use of “countervailing considerations” test).
31. See id. (setting forth court’s determination).  For a critical analysis of Hop-
per, see infra notes 191-237 and accompanying text.
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have in the future.32  This section considers NEPA’s apparent inef-
fectiveness in the face of other environmental statutes, such as the
ESA.33
II. FACTS
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Hopper epitomizes the diminish-
ing role of NEPA at the hands of the courts.34  This story begins in
1999, when the Massachusetts state legislature established Section
11F under Chapter 25A of the general laws of the state, and listed
the renewable energy requirements applicable to every retail sup-
plier of electricity in the state.35  Under Section 11F, the first re-
quirement detailed specific guidelines for the amount of energy to
be generated by renewable energy by December 31, 2003.36  These
requirements resulted in the creation of the Cape Wind in 2000, for
the purpose of providing offshore wind energy.37  Specifically, the
project planned to place wind turbines or mills on “monopile foun-
dations[,]” whereby the foundations would then be fused with the
ocean seabed in the waters off the coast of Cape Cod.38
Cape Wind was “one of the largest offshore wind projects in
the world.”39  Its goal was to install, operate, and maintain “130 off-
shore wind turbine generators” in the Nantucket Sound off the
coast of Massachusetts.40  The purpose of Cape Wind was simple: to
provide wind energy to the majority of the Cape Cod area.41  The
administrators for Cape Wind began the required regulatory pro-
32. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 157-61 (foreshadowing NEPA’s continuing
ineffectiveness). For a discussion of the future impacts of Hopper, see infra notes
238-256 and accompanying text.
33. See id. (giving reasons why NEPA is no longer effective).  For a discussion
of the future impacts of Hopper, see infra notes 238-256 and accompanying text.
34. See id. at 157-58 (describing NEPA’s changing role).
35. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A § 11F(a) (West (2012)) (explaining
renewable energy requirements that Massachusetts legislature mandate).
36. See id. at § 11F(a)(1) (explaining responsibility of retail electricity
suppliers).
37. See Pub. Emp. For Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
85 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining Cape Wind factual background).
38. See Cape Wind Project Overview, CAPE WIND, https://www.capewind.org/
what/overview (last visited Dec. 30, 2016) (describing Cape Wind setup, purpose,
and goals).
39. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Doc. CW201584) (explaining
Cape Wind factual background).
40. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Outer Continental
Shelf, Headquarters, Cape Wind Offshore Wind Development 2007, 71 Fed. Reg.
30693-01 (May 30, 2006)) (foreshadowing Cape Wind impact).
41. See id. (describing Cape Wind purpose).
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cess by filing a permit application with the Army Corps of Engineers
in late 2001.42  In late 2005, however, the Bureau of Ocean Energy
Management (BOEM) became the agency responsible for (1)
granting leases for “projects on the Outer Continental Shelf[,]” in-
volving renewable energy, and (2) controlling the remainder of the
approval process.43
BOEM took action to evaluate Cape Wind, and consulted with
several different agencies to fulfill its obligations under the ESA,
NEPA, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, and
many other controlling environmental laws.44  BOEM conferred
with Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) and began a formal consulta-
tion in compliance with the ESA.45  FWS had a duty to consider
Cape Wind and any adverse effects that the project potentially
posed to adjacent fish or wildlife.46  Specifically, one relevant con-
cern that arose with wind turbines was that birds could be killed in
the rotators that turned to create wind energy.47  FWS subsequently
issued a biological opinion and an incidental take statement listing
migratory birds as wildlife under the ESA.48  An incidental take
statement uses further analysis than a biological opinion and speci-
fies the impact of a proposed project.49  An incidental take state-
ment also lists the reasonable measures agencies should take
towards minimizing any negative occurrences, and sets forth future
terms, conditions, and procedures that agencies must follow.50  The
incidental take statement was applicable to “the roseate tern and
42. See id. (showing Army Corps of Engineers’ former role).
43. See id. at 89 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Outer Continen-
tal Shelf, Headquarters, Cape Wind Offshore Wind Development 2007, 71 Fed.
Reg. 30693-01 (May 30, 2006)) (noting BOEM replaced Army Corps of Engineers).
This change occurred as result of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. Id.  For a further
discussion of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, see Outer Continental Shelf, Head-
quarters, Cape Wind Offshore Wind Development 2007, 71 Fed. Reg. 30693-01
(May 30, 2006).
44. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (detailing steps BOEM took to comply
with laws).  Aside from the ESA, NEPA, and the Coast Guard and Maritime Trans-
portation Act, the D.C. District considered many other environmental laws the
Plaintiffs claimed had been violated. Id.  These laws included the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the National Historic Pres-
ervation Act. Id.  The court found that BOEM did not violate any of these
additional environmental laws. Id.
45. See id. (showing how BOEM fulfilled ESA duty).
46. See id. (explaining FWS’s ESA obligations).
47. See id. (describing wind turbine common problems).
48. See id. (explaining steps FWS took to comply with ESA).
49. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (West (2016)) (defining incidental take
statement).
50. See id. (explaining when to issue incidental take statement).
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piping plover[.]”51  FWS concluded that if BOEM granted Cape
Wind regulatory approval, then these birds likely would not be in
danger of extinction.52  FWS noted, however, that “the [wind] tur-
bines would nonetheless kill [between] [eighty and one hundred]
[ ] roseate terns and ten [ ] piping plovers[;]” it included, there-
fore, the incidental take statement with the biological opinion.53
During the period when the Army Corps of Engineers was re-
sponsible for regulating Cape Wind, it went through the process of
drafting an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to meet NEPA
guidelines.54  The Army Corps of Engineers also held a notice-and-
comment period, in which the public was free to read the EIS and
voice complaints.55  When BOEM took over Cape Wind agency reg-
ulation, the agency redrafted an EIS for Cape Wind and held an-
other public comment period.56  BOEM considered comments
from both the original EIS that the Army Corps of Engineers
drafted and the comments from the modified EIS.57  Subsequent to
the comment period, BOEM declared the EIS final and made it
publically available at the beginning of 2009.58  BOEM also con-
sulted with the Coast Guard to satisfy obligations under the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act.59  The Coast Guard issued
51. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States Fish and Wildlife Service Doc. FWS3) (explaining process
FWS took to issue incidental take statement).
52. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1088
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (explaining FWS final conclusion).
53. See id. (footnote omitted) (stating FWS actions).  The incidental take ad-
vised BOEM to adopt “feathering” mitigation method “to [ ] turn off [ ] windmills
during poor visibility periods to ‘reduce the risk of collision’ by birds flying
through the wind farm[.]” Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting United States Fish and
Wildlife Service’s incidental take statement).  BOEM challenged this mitigation ad-
vice as too detrimental, and in its final recommendation, FWS did not suggest the
feathering mitigation. Id. at 1089.
54. See id. at 1082 (explaining process Army Corps of Engineers took to draft
EIS).
55. See id. (explaining more about public comment period).
56. See id. (explaining process BOEM took to redraft EIS).
57. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 90 (showing BOEM actions in regard to
NEPA).
58. See id. (detailing BOEM steps under NEPA laws).
59. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1085 (showing how BOEM contacted Coast
Guard).  The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act grants the Com-
mander of the Coast Guard certain powers and obligations. See 14 U.S.C.A. § 1
(Westlaw though Pub. L. No. 109-241, Title 1, § 101(3) (July 11, 2006) (explaining
actual Act).  The Commander’s authority includes the power to issue a “lease, ease-
ment, or right-of-way” for certain renewable energy sources off the Outer Conti-
nental Shelf. Id. at § 414(a).  Further, Section 414 of the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act of 2006 requires that the Commander identify “rea-
sonable . . . conditions . . . necessary to provide for navigational safety[,]” when
issuing a “lease, easement, or right-of-way[.]” Id.
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certain terms for the Cape Wind lease in a recommendation that it
gave to BOEM, which BOEM subsequently incorporated into its
recommendations to Cape Wind.60  Finally, BOEM completed a
“Record of Decision[,]” which declared the allowance of a commer-
cial lease to Cape Wind to construct and operate the proposal, but
noted that a required “Construction and Operations Plan[ ]” had
to be submitted first.61  At the end of 2010, Cape Wind submitted
the “Constructions and Operations Plan[ ]” to BOEM, who ap-
proved the plan in April of 2011 after it determined the final EIS
adequately met all NEPA requirements.62
Several environmental agencies and individuals were con-
cerned about the Nantucket Sound and brought suits against a col-
lection of government agencies, including BOEM, the Coast Guard,
and FWS.63  The D.C. District consolidated these suits into one liti-
gation matter.64  The court heard arguments for alleged violations
of six statutes: NEPA, the Shelf Lands Act, the National Historic
Prevention Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ESA, and the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act.65  The D.C. District
granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant for all of the
alleged violations, except the ESA.66  The D.C. District found that
FWS had a duty to make an independent consideration, regarding
mitigating measures for Cape Wind, and ordered FWS to do so.67  It
remained in dispute whether FWS’s independent considerations
had to include Plaintiffs’ data, and thus, Plaintiffs asked the D.C.
District to interpret its own remand for this question.68  The D.C.
District (1) found no ESA violation, (2) determined that FWS did
not have to consider Plaintiffs data in its independent considera-
tion, and (3) granted summary judgment in favor of the Defen-
60. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1086 (highlighting how Coast Guard gave terms to
BOEM).
61. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 90-91 (detailing obligation BOEM
imposed).
62. See id. (explaining BOEM’s final approval of Cape Wind).
63. See id. at 93 (outlining litigation environmental groups brought).
64. See id. (providing arguments court heard).
65. See id. (explaining Plaintiffs’ claim).  The D.C. District also heard chal-
lenges under the Clean Water Act and the Rivers and Harbors Act. Id.  For more
information on Cape Wind, see Cape Wind Wins Major Legal Victories, CAPE WIND
(Mar. 14, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://www.capewind.org/node/1709 (showing history
of litigation).
66. See Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 130 (explaining conclusion court
reached).
67. See id. at 110 (explaining FWS duties FWS under ESA).
68. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (detailing how court interpreted own remand
concerning ESA question).
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dant.69  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) reviewed and affirmed the D.C.
District’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of the
Coast Guard in regard to the Coast Guard and Maritime Transpor-
tation Act violations.70  The D.C. Circuit reviewed and reversed the
D.C. District’s decision that granted summary judgment in favor of
BOEM for NEPA violations.71  Finally, the D.C. Circuit reviewed
and reversed the D.C. District’s decision that granted summary
judgment in favor of FWS for the ESA violations.72  Although the
D.C. Circuit found that BOEM violated NEPA because it failed to
complete an adequate EIS, the D.C. Circuit neither issued an in-
junction, nor required BOEM to issue a new impact statement.73
Instead, the D.C. Circuit simply required that the EIS had to rely on
a geological survey before construction for Cape Wind could
begin.74
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Beginning of NEPA
In 1969, Congress officially recognized that certain changes to
the environment were the result of human activity.75  To combat
these changes, Congress enacted NEPA for the purpose of holding
local, state, and federal governments, including agencies, responsi-
ble for issuing environmentally-friendly policies.76  Specifically,
these policies “relat[ed] to the prevention, abatement, and control
of environmental pollution, water and land resources, transporta-
tion, and economic and regional development.”77
69. See id. (explaining district court’s conclusion).
70. See id. at 1087 (noting D.C. Circuit’s affirmation of lower court decision).
71. See id. at 1083 (detailing court’s reversal).
72. See id. at 1090 (explaining court’s decision concerning ESA violation).
73. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084-90 (noting how court reversed lower court
decision).
74. See id. at 1084 (highlighting court’s limited remedy).
75. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 2 (Jan. 1,
1970)) (outlining NEPA’s origins).  Following this official recognition, the federal
government enacted several environmental acts to prevent damage to the environ-
ment throughout the rest of the twentieth century. See Laws and Executive Orders,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last up-
dated Sept. 8, 2016) (showing other acts).  These acts include the Clean Air Act of
1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act of 1980. Id.
76. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 91-190, Title I, § 102
(Jan. 1, 1970)) (explaining government agencies to which NEPA applies).
77. See id. at § 4371(b)(1) (stating NEPA policy purpose).
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NEPA is applicable to federal agencies and requires the prepa-
ration of an EIS for major projects “significantly affecting the qual-
ity of the human environment[.]”78  Agencies, however, are not
always required to complete an EIS, even in the case of major
projects.79  If an agency can show that there will be minimal envi-
ronmental effects resulting from a project, then NEPA laws may al-
low the agency to complete a more brief Environmental Assessment
(EA) in order to obtain permission for the project.80
According to the D.C. Circuit in Sierra Club v. United States Army
Corps of Engineers (Sierra Club),81 an agency must also examine the
environmental consequences of any project prior to giving ap-
proval.82  The purpose of assessments, such as an EIS and an EA, is
to give each environment-changing proposition due deliberation.83
These assessments also give the public advanced notice of any po-
tential changes the administrator of a given project requests.84
While NEPA does not prescribe a given outcome, there is a stan-
dard in place that requires agencies to take a “hard look” at propos-
als.85  The “hard look” test demands that an agency considers any
harmful environmental consequences of the project in order to
avoid uninformed agency action.86  Under NEPA, ultimately, an
agency must take steps to ensure the appropriate “process[ ]” oc-
78. See id. at § 4332(C) (detailing NEPA requirements for agencies).  An envi-
ronmental impact statement is prepared under NEPA if proposal to an agency is
considered major and “significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment[.]” Id.; see also National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process#EIS (last up-
dated Jan. 24, 2017) (explaining environmental impact statement process).
79. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 16 (2008) (explain-
ing difference between EISs and EAs).  An Environmental Assessment (EA) is used
to decide “whether or not a federal action has the potential to cause significant
effects.” See National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, EPA, https://
www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process#EIS (last up-
dated Jan. 24, 2017) (explaining more about environmental assessments).  In addi-
tion, an EA briefly includes (1) why the proposal is being requested, (2) alternative
options to be considered, (3) any consequences to the environment for either the
alternative option or the proposal, and (4) related agencies or people that need to
be involved. Id.
80. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 16 (explaining when federal agency can use EA).
81. 803 F.3d 31 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
82. See id. at 36 (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 756-57
(2004)) (detailing requirements in cases of private actions).
83. See id. (explaining purpose of NEPA’s mandate).
84. See id. (discussing public comment period).
85. See id. at 37 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989)) (explaining “hard look” requirement).
86. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51
(1989) (detailing what “hard look” requirement entails).
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curs to make any environmental risks known to the agency and the
public.87
B. Typical Treatment of NEPA Violations
Since the inception of NEPA, despite its noble purpose, the
Supreme Court constantly limited NEPA’s ultimate impact on the
environment.88  Courts have widely accepted that a violation of
NEPA “is subject to [treatment under] equity principles.”89  Courts
could, therefore, grant the grieved party some form of injunctive
relief, such as stopping an already-existing project.90  When BOEM
violated NEPA, however, courts did not automatically grant an in-
junction that completely stopped a project.91  Courts also did not
automatically require that the agency complete a new regulatory
approval process.92  Instead, courts “balance[ed] [ ] hardships[ ]”
and acknowledged “countervailing interests[.]”93  In fact, in many
cases, a NEPA violation did not result in a project stoppage if the
economic burden of suddenly halting an already-existing project
outweighed the economic benefits of stopping the project.94
A reviewing court ultimately used its discretion to decide
whether to grant an injunction or to impose a more limited punish-
ment, such as requiring minor modifications to an EIS or EA.95  To
decide, the reviewing court looked to “a ‘particularized analysis’ of
the violations that have occurred[ ] [and] [ ] the possibilities for
relief, and of any countervailing considerations of public inter-
est.”96  The D.C. Circuit described this process as an “analysis of
87. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97
(1983) (citation omitted) (explaining overall NEPA process).
88. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 157-58 (describing NEPA’s changing role).
For a discussion of relevant background on the purpose of NEPA, see supra note
78 and accompanying text.
89. See Pit River Tribe v. United States Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1080-81
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining equity principle’s NEPA applicability).
90. See id. (describing how injunctions are used).
91. See id. at 1081 (explaining injunction process).
92. See id. (explaining different NEPA relief options).
93. See id. (explaining applicable test for reliefs).
94. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (detailing court’s decision).
95. See id. (explaining court’s discretion in NEPA relief).  The United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission court gave an example of a modification needed
before any injunction against construction of tanks is granted. Id. at 1273.  The
court required the “completion of an EIS devoted to the safety and design alterna-
tives raised by NRDC.” Id.
96. See id. at 1272 (quoting Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (citing Alaska v. Andrus, 580
F.2d 465, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978)) (showing court balancing factors).
10
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injury to either or both parties, the public interest, and the balanc-
ing of interests[.]”97  A court, however, ultimately had the option to
simply notify an agency of its obligations under NEPA, as courts
have determined that this, alone, is sufficient to ensure
obedience.98
C. Origins of the ESA
Like NEPA, Congress adopted the ESA during a period when
environmental causes began to have a more prevalent role in the
laws of the United States.99  The ESA was enacted in 1973 for the
purpose of “provid[ing] a program for the conservation of such en-
dangered species and threatened species[.]”100  The ESA is applica-
ble to government agencies, and it provides the duties of an
agency.101  The ESA is also used to determine if a proposed agency
action “may affect listed species or critical habitat.”102  If an agency
determines that its actions may produce such an effect, then that
agency must schedule a formal consultation with FWS.103
FWS has the duty of giving the agency a written report, known
as a biological opinion, that “explain[s] how the proposed action
will affect [wildlife.]”104  If FWS subsequently finds the wildlife or
97. See Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d
502, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d
827, 832 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (explaining about NEPA relief factors).
98. See id. at 512 (reinforcing court’s discretion in punishment).
99. See George L. Blum, Annotation, Construction and Application of Citizen Suit
Requirements and Notice Provisions of Sec. 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 1540(g)(1), 1540(g)(2), 94 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 169 (2015) (describing ESA
origins and purpose).
100. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531(b) (West (2012)) (explaining ESA induction and
purpose).
101. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a) (West (2016)) (giving basic ESA background).
102. See id. (detailing agency duties under ESA).
103. See id. (explaining FWS role under ESA).
104. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 158 (1997) (explaining FWS’s respon-
sibility under ESA).  A biological opinion includes the following:
(1) A summary of the information on which the opinion is based; (2) A
detailed discussion of the effects of the action on listed species or critical
habitat; and (3) The Service’s opinion on whether the action is likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result in the de-
struction or adverse modification of critical habitat (a ‘jeopardy biologi-
cal opinion’); or, the action is not likely to jeopardize the continued
existence of a listed species or result in the destruction or adverse modifi-
cation of critical habitat (a ‘no jeopardy’ biological opinion).  A ‘jeop-
ardy’ biological opinion shall include reasonable and prudent
alternatives, if any.  If the Service is unable to develop such alternatives, it
will indicate that to the best of its knowledge there are no reasonable and
prudent alternatives.
50 C.F.R. 402.14(h) (West {2016}).
11
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wildlife habitat will be adversely affected, then FWS must recom-
mend “reasonable and prudent alternatives” through an incidental
take statement to minimize any such consequences.105  FWS must
base a biological opinion and any accompanying incidental take
statement upon “the best scientific and commercial data availa-
ble[.]”106  The ESA ultimately dictates how the FWS interacts with
relevant agencies.107
D. Typical Treatment of ESA Violations
At its inception, the ESA had the goal of “halt[ing] and re-
vers[ing] the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”108
The Supreme Court brought this idea to fruition when it ruled that
it had to permanently stop a federal dam project, developed by
Tennessee Valley Authority, in order to save the habitat of the snail
darter.109  The Court made this ruling despite that the dam was vir-
tually constructed and had millions of dollars invested in it.110
Over time, it became arguably more difficult to obtain such promis-
ing results because of the new preliminary injunction standard, the
Winter’s test.111  The Supreme Court created the Winter’s test in Win-
ter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (Winter).112 In Winter, the
plaintiffs requested an injunction from the Court to stop the Navy’s
use of “ ‘mid-frequency active’ (MFA) sonar[ ]” for training exer-
105. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 158 (explaining FWS’s responsibility).  Under the
ESA, after FWS issues a biological opinion that concludes there is possibility of
jeopardy or adverse effects to habitat, it must issue an incidental take statement.
Id.
106. See 50 C.F.R. 402.14(g)(8) (West (2016)) (explaining data standard FWS
used).
107. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536 (West (2012)) (explaining ESA scope); see also
AT&T Wireless Servs. Inc. v. F.C.C., 365 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (explain-
ing FWS’ ESA duty).  In the court’s analysis in AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. v. F.C.C.,
the D.C. Circuit examines the technical issue of how a court can rule on its previ-
ous interpretations on remand concerning this ESA issue. AT&T Wireless Servs.
Inc., 365 F.3d at 1099.
108. See J.B. Ruhl, The Endangered Species Act’s Fall from Grace in the Supreme
Court, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 487, 488 (2012) (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)) (explaining ESA background).
109. See id. (giving background to seminal United States Supreme Court case,
Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).  For a further explanation of the
Supreme Court’s decision, see also Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978) (demonstrating Supreme Court support of ESA).
110. See Ruhl, supra note 108, at 489 (explaining decision’s huge economic
cost).
111. See Morath, supra note 12, at 155 (explaining ESA challenges from
Winter).
112. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
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cises because the activity allegedly violated the ESA and NEPA.113
The Winter’s test requires:
[That] [a] plaintiff [who is] seeking a preliminary injunc-
tion must establish that he [or she] is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he [or she] is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his [or her] favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest.114
Despite the modern use of the Winter’s test, some studies show
that the ESA’s effectiveness in obtaining injunctions has not
changed since the introduction of the Winter’s test.115  Proponents
of these studies suggest that this effect can be attributed, in part, to
the substantive nature of the ESA.116  The ESA differs from NEPA
because NEPA is only a procedural framework that does not re-
quire “a particular substantive result for environmental
protection.”117
E. Origins of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act
Among the many purposes of the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Act, safety and environmental protection of the
maritime are two objectives that are directly related to the environ-
ment.118  In furtherance of these goals, Congress has given the
Coast Guard the authority to “grant a lease, easement, or right-of-
way on the outer Continental Shelf for [certain] activities[.]119  For
these activities, the Coast Guard must establish certain regulations
113. See id. at 13 (explaining creation of Winter’s test).
114. See Morath, supra note 12, at 157 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 19) (ex-
plaining Winter’s factors).
115. See id. at 160 (detailing quantitative data).  This data illustrates that, so
far, the Winter’s test has minimally impacted injunctions overall. Id.  For a further
discussion of the Winter case, see supra note 79 and accompanying text.
116. See Melaney Payne, Critically Acclaimed But Not Critically Followed – The In-
applicability Of The National Environmental Policy Act To Federal Agency Actions: Douglas
County v. Babbitt, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 339, 347 (1996) (explaining ESA’s substantive
nature).
117. See Payne, supra note 116, at 347 (explaining differences between NEPA
and ESA); see also Aliza M. Cohen, Note, NEPA in The Hot Seat: A Proposal For An
Office Of Environmental Analysis, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 169, 202 (2010) (provid-
ing background information NEPA and ESA).
118. See 14 U.S.C.A. § 1 (Westlaw though Pub. L. No. 109-241, Title 1, § 101
(July 11, 2006)) (explaining Coast Guard’s purpose).
119. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1337(p)(1) (West (2012)) (describing Congress’s dele-
gation of power).  Some of the activities that are within the scope of the Coast
Guard’s power include “support [of] exploration, development, production, or
storage of oil or natural gas[.]” Id.
13
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based on what the agency finds necessary to ensure navigational
safety for every “lease, easement, or right-of-way considered by the
Secretary [of the Interior].”120  When working with other agencies,
the Coast Guard must provide these agencies with recommenda-
tions.121  In turn, these agencies must “incorporate the Coast
Guard’s [recommendations] [ ] into any leases” that they create to
further the goal of maritime safety.122
On certain occasions, various environmental groups ques-
tioned the manner in which the Coast Guard handled its delegated
authority to grant a “lease, easement, or right-of-way[.]”123  In as-
sessing the actions of the Coast Guard, courts have often adhered to
deference under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).124  The
APA serves to bring “uniformity of procedure and standardization
of administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose cus-
toms had departed widely from each other.”125  More fundamen-
tally, the APA aims “to curtail and change the practice of
embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and
judge.”126  In accordance with the APA, when a court is reviewing
an agency’s interpretation of its own statute, it is given substantial
120. See 14 U.S.C.A. § 663 (Westlaw though Pub. L. No. 109-241, Title VI,
§ 414 (July 11, 2006)) (explaining Coast Guard’s responsibilities under § 414 of
Act).
121. Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1086
(D.C. Cir 2016) (providing role of Coast Guard).
122. See id. (explaining Coast Guard regulation process).  Section 4(e) of the
Federal Power Act is another act that has similar provisions to those included in
the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e) (West
(2012)) (explaining Federal Power Act).  The Act is discussed extensively in the
Escondido case.  Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466
U.S. 765, 777 (1984) (explaining Coast Guard authority court interpreted).  Under
the Federal Power Act, any license granted “must be reasonably related to the ob-
jective of the regulating agency.” Id.
123. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
85-95 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing 43 U.S.C. 1337(p)) (evaluating Coast Guard duty); see
also Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety, 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (analyzing
deference under Administrative Procedure Act).
124. See Collins, 351 F.3d at 1253 (discussing Coast Guard expertise).
125. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) (giving goals of
Act).
126. See id. (detailing purpose of Act).  The APA also governs the standard of
review for determining whether a government agency complied with a federal or
state law; this standard is “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion[.]”
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(a) (West (2012)) (explaining APA standard).
14
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weight.127  Courts allow this deference to the agency because of its
expertise in certain areas.128
The D.C. District found that at least a threshold level of defer-
ence must be granted to the Coast Guard in areas concerning the
administration of licenses for projects.129  The D.C. District rea-
soned that these areas were appropriate due to the Coast Guard’s
expertise in maritime safety.130 The D.C. District court noted that
the level of deference may appear to be similar to that in Skidmore,
but it is not clearly defined by the court.131  The court noted, how-
ever, that an agency does not need a position that “is more convinc-
ing than its adversaries’[.]”132
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Hopper, the D.C. Circuit reversed two out of the three D.C.
District’s findings and affirmed the D.C. District’s third finding, de-
spite D.C. Circuit’s affirmation based on different legal reasoning
than that of the D.C. District.133  The D.C. Circuit affirmed that
neither the Coast Guard nor BOEM violated the Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation Act.134  The D.C. Circuit then reversed
the D.C. District’s decision, that FWS had not violated the ESA and
127. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (explaining deference process).
128. See id. (explaining reasoning for deference). Chevron deference is a test
courts use to determine what level of deference to give an agency action. Id. at
842.  The court must first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Id.  If the issue is ambiguous, then Congress looks to see if the
agency interpretation is “a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.  The
court does not formulate or impose its own interpretation of the statue upon the
agency. Id. at 843; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (ex-
plaining lower threshold level of deference).  Under Skidmore deference, while an
agency decision is not binding on a court, a court will consider the experience and
judgment of the agency with weight equal to “the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.” Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (detailing Skidmore deference).
129. See Collins, 351 F.3d at 1254 (discussing deference standard court
selected).
130. See id. (explaining Coast Guard’s experience).
131. See id. (giving Skidmore-like deference).
132. See id. (detailing court decision).  The court did not provide complete
clarity on what deference courts should give, but noted that it should be similar to
Skidmore. Id.  The court explained that the deference given should be less than
Chevron deference, but “more than acknowledgement that the agency’s position is
more convincing than its adversaries’[.]” Id.
133. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Hopper, 827 F.3d 1077, 1082-
91 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (analyzing and deciding each issue).
134. See id. at 1087 (giving court’s affirming ruling).
15
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its decision that BOEM had not violated NEPA.135  Although the
D.C. Circuit found that BOEM violated NEPA, the court did not
require BOEM to issue a new EIS or EA.136  The court concluded
that all the project’s regulatory approvals would remain in effect
and the project could continue with no hindrance.137  The court
found that BOEM did not need to issue a new EIS or EA provided
that it first incorporate “adequate geological surveys” into the al-
ready-existing EIS.138
A. Giving Deference: An Analysis of the Coast Guard Leases
The plaintiff environmental groups asked the court to decide
whether the terms of the Cape Wind leases were reasonable in rela-
tion to the objective of Section 414.139  Section 414 of the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act aims “to provide for navi-
gational safety[.]”140  The Plaintiffs noted that the Defendant did
not propose reasonable alternatives in the terms of the lease the
Coast Guard approved.141  As a result, the Plaintiffs also alleged that
the lease failed to consider present conditions surrounding the pro-
ject.142  In Beaudreau, the D.C. District looked to Section 4(e) of the
Federal Power Act (FPA), which the court discussed in Escondido
Mut. Water v. La Jolla (Escondido).143  The Escondido court inter-
preted the FPA to require the terms of any licenses granted be “rea-
sonably related to [the Secretary’s] goal[.]144  The Escondido court
also noted that the standard of review should be equivalent to “arbi-
trary and capricious[.]”145  The D.C. District found that the Escon-
dido court’s reasoning should also apply to Section 414 of the Coast
Guard and Maritime Transportation Act, “[g]iven the similarity be-
135. See id. at 1083, 1091 (explaining court’s reversing rulings).
136. See id. at 1085 (explaining court’s minimal punishment).
137. See id. at 1084 (detailing court’s limited requirements).
138. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (explaining court’s NEPA violation remedy).
139. See id. at 1086 (citation omitted) (discussing issue court of appeals
faced).
140. See id. (explaining Section 414).
141. See id. at 1087 (citation omitted) (explaining Plaintiffs’ legal arguments).
142. See id. (giving Plaintiffs’ legal assertion support).
143. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1086 (explaining district court’s analysis).  For a
further discussion of the Escondido case, see supra note 122 and accompanying text.
144. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
96-97 (D.D.C. 2014) (discussing FPA in Escondido).
145. See id. at 97 (detailing Escondido standard of review).  The Federal Power
Act (FPA) gives the Secretary of Interior the responsibility of issuing licenses for
hydroelectric facilities, among other purposes. See generally id. Section 4(e) of the
FPA mandates that the Coast Guard issues must be reasonably related to “adequate
protection and utilization of” property under the Act. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 797(e)
(West (2012)) (explaining Coast Guard duties under FPA).
16
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tween the statutory schemes” shared by the acts.146  Using the Escon-
dido standard, the D.C. District in Beaudreau ultimately found that
there was sufficient evidence to support the Coast Guard’s asser-
tion.147  The Coast Guard argued that the alleged “forward-looking
terms” were reasonably related to its objective to “provide for navi-
gational safety[.]”148  While the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district
court’s ultimate conclusion in Hopper, the D.C. Circuit reached its
ruling “for somewhat different reasons.”149  The court ultimately
adopted a deference standard rather than the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard.150
The D.C. Circuit in Hopper used a different standard than that
used by the D.C. District to evaluate whether there was a reasonable
relationship between the terms of the license granted and the “navi-
gational safety” objective.151  Instead of the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard the D.C. District adopted, the D.C. Circuit simply
reasoned that the agency was entitled to some level of deference,
similar to a Skidmore standard.152  To support this decision, the
court looked to Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety,153 which determined
that the Coast Guard had certain expertise under the Coast Guard
and Martine Transportation Act.154  In addition, as support, the
D.C. Circuit interpreted Section 414 of the Coast Guard and Mari-
time Transportation Act as allowing for some “informational gaps
146. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (explaining district court’s analysis).
147. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1086 (providing district court’s final conclusion).
148. See id. (explaining district court’s analysis).
149. See id. (presenting D.C. Circuit’s conclusion).
150. See id. (distinguishing D.C. Circuit’s ruling from lower court); see also
Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (citation omitted) (explaining “arbitrary and capri-
cious” standard).
151. See id. at 1086-87 (quoting 14 U.S.C.A. § 663 (Westlaw though Pub. L.
No. 109-241, Title IV, § 414 (July 11, 2006)) (footnote omitted) (describing defer-
ence standard).
152. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1086-87 (describing deference standard); see also
Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (citation omitted) (using “arbitrary and capricious”
standard); see generally Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety, 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (presenting Skidmore deference). Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety estab-
lished the Coast Guard’s expertise in maritime safety; the case stated that there are
several levels of deference, but that ultimately it was not necessary to go through
each level because the lowest level of deference still supports the notion that the
Coast Guard has certain expertise in maritime safety. Id.  For a further discussion
of the levels of deference that can be given to agencies and how each is deter-
mined, see supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
153. 351 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
154. See id. at 1253-54 (describing deference standard).  For a further discus-
sion of Collins, see supra note 129 and accompanying text.
17
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that can be filled in later[ ]” for terms of a granted lease.155  Al-
though the court’s reasoning differed from the D.C. District, the
D.C. Circuit ultimately found that the Coast Guard did not violate
Section 414 of the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Act.156
B. ESA Violated: “Incidental Take” Arbitrary and Capricious
The second issue the D.C. Circuit addressed in Hopper was
whether FWS’s incidental take statement, which it included in its
biological opinion to BOEM, was “arbitrary and capricious[,]” and
thus, in violation of the ESA.157  The Plaintiffs in Hopper argued that
FWS’s incidental take statement violated the ESA because it failed
to include a feathering mitigation measure.158  Plaintiffs also ar-
gued that the incidental take statement failed to use “the ‘best sci-
entific and commercial data available[ ]’” because it did not
consider the information that they submitted.159  More specifically,
the Plaintiffs alleged that FWS had an obligation under the ESA to
mitigate bird deaths by implementing feathering.160  The feather-
ing mitigation the Plaintiffs proposed limits the time of day that the
wind turbines spin during certain times of the year.161  By limiting
the wind turbines spinning when bird migration is at its highest,
many bird deaths can be prevented.162  The Plaintiffs also argued
that FWS should have included the 2014 data because FWS consid-
ered the 2008 opinion of its own internal in-house economist in
2014.163  In Beaudreau, the D.C. District originally found that FWS
155. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1087 (explaining court’s Section 414 analysis).
Specifically, the court looked to the part of Section 414, which “requires the Coast
Guard to issue its terms at least ‘60 days before’ the Bureau [BOEM] publishes its
draft environmental impact statement.” Id. (citation omitted).  The court rea-
soned that, if the Coast Guard must publish terms of a draft EIS so far in advance
of BOEM’s draft publication, there must be some room for terms to be developed
in more detail later. Id.
156. See id. (describing court’s final conclusion).
157. See id. at 1088 (describing issue court analyzed).
158. See id. (describing Plaintiffs’ claim).
159. See id. (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (West {2016}) (describing
Plaintiffs’ submission).  For a further discussion of the feathering mitigation, see
infra note 196 and accompanying text.
160. Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1089 (citing Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 107)
(describing Plaintiffs’ allegation).  For a further discussion of the feathering miti-
gation, see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
161. See id. at 1088 (introducing feathering mitigation).
162. See id. (explaining feathering mitigation).  For a further discussion of the
feathering mitigation, see infra note 196 and accompanying text.
163. See id. at 1089 (describing Plaintiffs’ argument regarding FWS’s
obligation).
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was required “to ‘make an independent determination’ [of]
whether” BOEM should include the feathering mitigation to avoid
killing the migratory birds.164  On remand, however, the D.C. Dis-
trict found that under “an independent determination[,]” FWS did
not need to consider the data the Plaintiffs submitted in 2014.165
In Hopper, the D.C. Circuit reversed and found that FWS’s final
incidental take statement was “arbitrary and capricious,” and thus,
an ESA violation.166  The court reasoned that regardless of the year
from which FWS’s in-house economist applied, the determination
was made in 2014.167  The court, thus, concluded that FWS’s deci-
sion to forgo feathering mitigation contained “additional analysis”
on feathering.168  Since FWS made a new determination in 2014,
the court found that FWS reopened the record, and, subsequently,
it mandated that the FWS also consider the plaintiffs’ data.169  The
court ultimately vacated the incidental take statement FWS
created.170
C. NEPA Violated: But Construction to Continue After
Geological Survey Component Considered
Finally, the D.C. Circuit turned to the issue of whether the EIS
that BOEM issued contained “inadequate ‘geophysical and ge-
otechnical’ surveys[,]” and thus, violated NEPA.171  The Plaintiffs
argued that the EIS violated NEPA because it failed to produce “suf-
ficient site-specific data on seafloor and subsurface hazards[.]”172
To support their allegation that the EIS did not contain the neces-
sary site-specific data, the Plaintiffs presented several concerning
emails sent to the manager of Cape Wind from BOEM’s geolo-
164. See id. (quoting Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 130) (explaining district
court’s March 14, 2014 remand).
165. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1089, 90 (quoting Joint Appendix at 777-78)
(describing district court’s decision).  The district court based this decision in part
on FWS’s argument that the in-house economist only considered information
available “at the time the statement was issued in 2008.” Id. at 1089 (quoting PEER
Br. at 17-18).  The court supported its remand order decision by looking to AT&T
Wireless Servs., Inc., which provided that “the court is generally the authoritative
interpreter of its own remand[.]” Id. (citing AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc. v. F.C.C.,
365 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
166. See id. (describing court’s conclusion about ESA violation).
167. See id. (describing court’s analysis).
168. See id. (quoting Defendants Br. at 63) (detailing court conclusion about
re-opened record).
169. See id. (expressing court’s reasoning).
170. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (explaining court’s final decision).
171. Id. at 1081 (quoting Alliance Br. at 21) (introducing NEPA violation
issue).
172. Id. (quoting Alliance Br. at 26-27) (describing Plaintiffs’ claims).
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gist.173  One email concluded that the project “ha[d] not acquired
sufficient geophysical data and information to adequately delineate
in detail geologic hazards and conditions in the vicinity ([one thou-
sand mile] radius) of even one proposed turbine location[.]”174
Arguing before the D.C. District, the plaintiffs in Beaudreau al-
leged that the insufficient geophysical or geotechnical surveys vio-
lated the Shelf Lands Act.175  At this point, the plaintiffs did not
allege that BOEM violated NEPA because of the insufficient
surveys, although they alleged that BOEM violated NEPA for other
reasons.176  The D.C. District rejected the plaintiffs’ claims under
both NEPA and the Shelf Lands Act.177  The plaintiffs repackaged
the insufficient survey claims and argued that the surveys violated
NEPA, rather than the Shelf Lands Act, before the D.C. Circuit.178
On review in Hopper, the D.C. Circuit found that the surveys
were “arbitrary and capricious[,]” and thus, violated NEPA.179  To
reach this conclusion, the court looked to see if BOEM “[took] a
‘hard look’ at the geological and geophysical environment” of the
Cape Wind project area.180  Under the “hard look” test, BOEM had
to both consider any harmful environmental consequences of a
project, and take the necessary steps to make environmental risks
known to the agency and the public.181  The D.C. Circuit found
that while BOEM may have completed additional surveys as re-
quired, it was apparent that BOEM did not rely on any such surveys
in its final EIS.182
The D.C. Circuit further reasoned that BOEM failed the “hard
look” test because BOEM did not consider the surveys and looked
exclusively to data “so roundly criticized by its ‘own experts[.]’”183
Although the D.C. Circuit found that BOEM violated NEPA, the
173. Id. at 1082 (providing general facts about EIS).
174. See id. at 1083 (illustrating why EIS is insufficient).
175. See Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Beaudreau, 25 F. Supp. 3d 67,
121 (D.D.C. 2014) (explaining plaintiffs’ Shelf Lands Act argument in Beaudreau).
176. See id. at 122 (explaining plaintiffs’ NEPA argument).
177. See id. at 121-23 (expressing district court’s conclusion).
178. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1083 (giving Plaintiffs’ NEPA claim).
179. Id. at 1082-83 (footnote omitted) (explaining D.C. Circuit’s conclusion).
180. See id. at 1083 (quoting Defendants Br. at 40) (providing test to evaluate
issue).  For a further discussion of the “hard look” test, see supra note 60 and ac-
companying text.
181. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51
(1989) (detailing what “hard look” requirement entails); see also Balt. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 96 (1983) (explaining NEPA
requirements).
182. Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1083 (examining court’s analysis).
183. Id. (citation omitted) (explaining court’s conclusion).
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court also determined that the project could continue.184  The
court also found that BOEM did not need to re-approve the “regu-
latory approval[s]” that Cape Wind attained.185  The D.C. Circuit
based this determination on United States Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion and its “countervailing considerations” test.186  Under this test,
a court must weigh the NEPA violation and the equitable relief a
court can provide against the economic expense or public inter-
est.187  The D.C. Circuit applied the “countervailing considerations”
test and found the economic expense and public interest out-
weighed equitable NEPA relief.188  Specifically, the court found that
the Massachusetts law regarding renewable energy requirements
and the decade-long project delay outweighed the need for a new
EIS and regulatory approvals process.189  As such, the court in Hop-
per required that BOEM only incorporate a geological survey into
the EIS before Cape Wind’s wind turbine construction began.190
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit in Hopper found that both BOEM’s and FWS’s
actions violated NEPA and the ESA.191  The court, however, neither
vacated the regulatory approval process nor the lease already
granted to Cape Wind.192  The court concluded that the project
could proceed after BOEM incorporated a geological survey into
the EIS.193  The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that NEPA violations oc-
curred is an accurate interpretation of the current precedent sur-
rounding NEPA.194  The D.C. Circuit’s conclusion regarding the
appropriate remedy for the NEPA violation, however, can best be
184. Id. at 1083-84 (giving court’s remedy).
185. Id. (providing BOEM does not need re-approvals).
186. Id. at 1084 (introducing “countervailing considerations” test); see also
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 606 F.2d
1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (giving origins of “countervailing considerations” test).
187. Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (citing United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, 606 F.2d at 1272) (summarizing how courts apply “countervailing con-
siderations” test).  For a further discussion of the “countervailing considerations”
test, see supra note 18 and accompanying text.
188. Id. (giving results of test).
189. See id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25A § 11F(a) (West (2012)) (ex-
plaining court’s analysis).
190. See id. at 1084 (providing court’s conclusion and remedy).
191. See id. at 1083-85, 1089-90 (restating court’s conclusion).
192. Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (explaining court’s decision).
193. See id. (describing limited consequence for NEPA violation).
194. See id. at 1081-84 (explaining step-by-step requirements of each statute).
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described as predictable.195  Although the project will likely move
forward, there is still a chance the project will adopt some form of
mitigation to avoid unnecessary bird deaths, such as feathering.196
The potential adoption of this kind of mitigation is due to FWS’s
ESA violation and the D.C. Circuit’s ruling that required a new inci-
dental take statement.197 The overall outcome in Hopper illustrates
NEPA’s further deterioration and places NEPA’s effectiveness in
question.198  NEPA’s effectiveness becomes especially uncertain in
comparison to the ESA’s effectiveness because the ESA may yield a
positive impact if feathering is adopted.199
A. NEPA Remedies Under a “Hard Look” Analysis
When the D.C. Circuit analyzed BOEM’s actions as related to
NEPA, it correctly identified the “hard look” test as the proper
method to determine whether BOEM’s actions complied with
NEPA.200  The D.C. Circuit also correctly asserted that the “hard
look” test, established in Sierra Club “applie[d] to the authorization
[ ] of private action[ ]” permits.201  Under NEPA, an agency must
have used published environmental impact statements to alert the
public about agency actions that may have an impact on the envi-
ronment.202  The statement also must have described potential di-
rect and indirect effects.203  The D.C. Circuit in Hopper found that
BOEM’s 2009 statement “[did] not adequately assess the seafloor
and subsurface hazards of the Sound.”204  The D.C. Circuit sup-
ported its conclusion with the series of internal emails the Plaintiffs
presented regarding the internal geologists’ concerns about Cape
Wind.205  The emails raised many red flags; one email stated that
195. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 184-88 (describing difficulties that NEPA
has faced).
196. Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1089-90 (explaining possibility of feathering
mitigation).
197. See id. (explaining FWS requirements).
198. Hausman, supra note 1, at 184-88 (questioning effectiveness of NEPA).
199. See Morath, supra note 12, at 162-68 (describing ESA environmental law
violations).
200. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1083 (explaining “hard look” test).
201. See id. (citing Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 803 F.3d
31, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (illustrating how “hard look” test applies to agencies).
202. See Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 37 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) (West
{2012}) (explaining requirements for each agency).
203. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(C) ((West {2012}) (explaining basic
agency requirements under NEPA).  For a further discussion about EIS and re-
lated rules for agencies, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
204. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1082 (footnote omitted) (explaining court’s legal
reasoning and conclusion).
205. See id. (detailing proof Plaintiffs provided to support argument).
22
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol28/iss2/2
2017] ORDER RESTORED? 229
the “surveys [did not] seem to conform (even loosely) to the ‘Gui-
dance Notes on Site Investigations for Offshore Renewable Energy
Projects[.]’”206  The court concluded that BOEM violated NEPA
since BOEM neither took a “hard look” nor contemplated all major
environmental impacts in the EIS.207
After the D.C. Circuit in Hopper found that BOEM violated
NEPA, the court considered the results emanating from this viola-
tion.208  The D.C. Circuit correctly applied the “countervailing con-
siderations” standard to determine whether a preliminary
injunction should be granted.209  This balancing test weighs relief
options against public interests in project continuation, including
social or economic factors.210  The D.C. Circuit established this test
in United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which granted courts
wide discretion in determining the outcome of the “countervailing
considerations” test.211  When the D.C. Circuit applied the test, it
specifically acknowledged that “it would be imprudent to allow
Cape Wind to begin construction before it can ‘ensure the seafloor
[is] able to support’ its facilities.”212  The court also acknowledged
that the administrators of Cape Wind had essentially “no prior ex-
perience [in] developing[ ] [or] operating offshore wind farms[ ]”
on the seafloor; the court, however, ultimately provided limited
remedies to the Plaintiffs.213  Because of the decade of litigation
and regulatory process, the D.C. Circuit asserted the economic cost
of the project was already burdensome.214
206. Id. (quoting Defendants Br. at 41) (giving specific examples of how
BOEM violated NEPA).
207. See id. at 1083 (citing Defendants Br. at 40; Sierra Club, 803 F.3d at 37)
(providing facts and explaining court’s legal conclusions).
208. See id. at 1084 (explaining court’s conclusion and remedy).
209. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (citing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n., 606 F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (dis-
cussing when “countervailing considerations” test is applicable).
210. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Regulatory Comm’n., 606
F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.D.C. 1979) (explaining “countervailing considerations” test).
211. See id. (examining factors of test); see also Pit River Tribe v. United States
Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010); Jones v. District of Columbia
Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (providing ori-
gins and factors for “countervailing considerations” test).
212. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (citation omitted) (giving court’s concerns).
213. See id. (citation omitted) (exploring safety of installing and operating
wind farm).  For a further discussion on why the court is essentially allowing
BOEM to do little to nothing and permitting the project to proceed, see infra note
216 and accompanying text.
214. See id. (providing duration of litigation).
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The court offered a “compromise” that required BOEM to in-
corporate a geological survey in the EIS before construction.215  De-
spite this requirement, the D.C. Circuit explained that BOEM’s
2012 Cape Wind Survey could be used at the discretion of BOEM if
the “survey[ ] adequately address[ed] the geological concerns dis-
cussed above[.]”216  Although BOEM completed the 2012 survey af-
ter the survey at issue in Hopper, the 2012 survey was completed
prior to the Hopper litigation.217  Ultimately, this conclusion is
within the scope of the “countervailing considerations” test because
the test affords discretion to a court.218  The outcome is also well
within the recent pattern of NEPA enforcement.219  The point of
interest, however, is the irony in enforcing NEPA by condemning
the agency for lack of detail and still allowing project to proceed
with little to no consequences.220
B. Analyzing ESA Violation: FWS Arbitrary and Capricious
When the D.C. Circuit analyzed whether FWS violated the ESA
by producing an “arbitrary and capricious” incidental take state-
ment, the court correctly identified that the statement must be
based upon “the ‘best scientific and commercial data availa-
ble[.]’”221  This language is found directly in Sections 1536(a)(2)
and (c)(1) of Title 16 of the United States Code (Section 1536),
and the language is a statutory requirement for the incidental take
statement.222  The D.C. Circuit also correctly identified that courts
should review cases using the “arbitrary and capricious” standard to
215. See id. (detailing how court reached compromise).
216. See id. at 1084 n.5 (explaining court’s endnote about geophysical survey).
This endnote comment by the D.C. Circuit is a potential area for concern because
of the discretion it gave BOEM. Id.  The endnote allowed BOEM to use a survey
from 2012 in the EIS if BOEM felt it met all NEPA requirements. Id.  This is con-
cerning given that BOEM’s judgment on what to include in an EIS to comply with
NEPA is the entire reason NEPA was violated to start with. Id. at 1084.  Addition-
ally, even if BOEM’s judgment is not sound, the process to challenge it could take
years of litigation. Id. at 1081.
217. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 n.5 (explaining EIS timeline).
218. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 606 F.2d at 1272 (examining factors which
allow for judicial discretion).
219. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 184-88 (describing NEPA’s pattern of
enforcement).
220. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (giving NEPA remedy); see also Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 606 F.2d at 1272 (explaining NEPA’s past interpretations).
221. See id. at 1088 (reiterating D.C. Circuit’s analysis); 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1536(a)(2), (c)(1) (West {2012}) (explaining statutory requirements of agen-
cies); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) (West {2016}) (providing specific
requirements).
222. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2), (c)(1) (West 2012) (explaining origins of
“best scientific and commercial data available” standard).
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol28/iss2/2
2017] ORDER RESTORED? 231
determine whether the incidental take statement violated Section
1536.223  The D.C. Circuit in Hopper accepted Plaintiffs’ argument
that the incidental take statement FWS issued did not meet “the
‘best scientific and commercial data available’” standard.224  Plain-
tiffs specifically argued that the standard was not met because the
incidental take statement omitted the data on feathering mitigation
Plaintiffs submitted.225
The D.C. District in Beaudreau originally determined that Cape
Wind was not under an obligation to consider the scientific data
submitted by plaintiffs.226  The D.C. District interpreted its own re-
mand language to reach this conclusion, and it found that FWS did
not violate the ESA.227  The D.C. Circuit, however, was able to reach
its conclusion without addressing how a court can interpret its own
remand, which left the issue unresolved.228  The D.C. Circuit deter-
mined that FWS opened the record in considering its in-house
economist 2008 opinion during 2014, and thus, it found that FWS
must also consider the Plaintiffs’ 2014 submissions.229
Although the ESA violations notably do not have the powerful
results they once did, the Hopper decision and violation penalty
demonstrate an ESA-friendly interpretation.230  The D.C. Circuit va-
cated the incidental take statement that FWS produced as a result
of FWS’s ESA violation.231  The court required FWS to complete a
new incidental take statement that considers Plaintiffs’ submis-
sions.232  Plaintiffs’ submissions contained both “scientific and eco-
nomic data” to support their assertion that if Cape Wind adopted
the feathering mitigation tactic, it would only have a minor eco-
nomic cost.233
223. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1088 (detailing arbitrary and capricious
standard).
224. See id. (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2), (c)(1) (West {2012}); 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.14(g)(8) (West {2012}) (explaining court’s conclusion).
225. See id. (giving FWS obligations under standard).
226. See id. at 1089 (citation omitted) (explaining March 14, 2014 remand).
227. See id. at 1090 (citation omitted) (examining feathering mitigation and
scientific data).
228. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (discussing unresolved issue left open).
229. See id. (citing Defendants Br. at 63) (detailing how court avoided answer-
ing remand question).
230. See Ruhl, supra note 108, at 488-91 (explaining ESA’s power
fluctuations).
231. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (providing court’s ESA violation remedy).
232. See id. (explaining court’s ESA violation ruling).
233. See id. at 1089 (quoting PEER Br. at 17-18) (detailing Plaintiffs’
assertions).
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The submissions also illustrated that several other government
agencies have had “to ‘make comparable operational adjustments
to minimize [harm to] protected species.’”234  With this evidence, it
is quite possible that the new incidental take statement may contain
a required mitigation measure.235  If the project ever becomes oper-
ational, a required measure would force Cape Wind to adopt the
mitigation.236  Although the project is still likely to continue after
BOEM completes the minor court-required NEPA remedies, there
is still a chance that the ESA repercussions will make a positive envi-
ronmental change.237
VI. IMPACT
Although the decision in Hopper is not surprising or law-shap-
ing, Hopper’s significance can be found in the message it sends to
many federal agencies.238  The ruling in Hopper follows the trend of
many courts that limit the remedies of NEPA violations when there
are “public interest” factors opposing strong NEPA remedies.239  As
a result of the latest NEPA limitations, NEPA’s effectiveness and its
goal become questionable to agencies that consider all environ-
mental impacts of projects.240
A. Limited NEPA, Limited Agency Deterrence
A potential issue Hopper creates is that NEPA will become less
effective because it will not provide the same deterrent effect
against NEPA violations as that of other environmental statutes,
such as the ESA.241  In Hopper, the D.C. Circuit considered an ESA
issue and ruled that FWS violated the ESA because it failed to con-
sider Plaintiffs’ submissions.242  These submissions detailed certain
234. See id. (quoting PEER Br. at 17-18) (summarizing data Plaintiffs’ gave on
mitigation).
235. See id. at 1090 (foreshadowing future mitigation possible).
236. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (explaining future FWS ESA obligations).
237. See id. (discussing court’s decision).
238. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 185 (illustrating NEPA’s limited agency
deterrence effect).
239. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Regulatory Comm’n., 606
F.2d 1261, 1272 (D.D.C. 1979) (discussing widespread adoption of “countervailing
considerations”-like test).
240. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 185 (citing Lawrence Gerschwer, Informa-
tional Standing Under NEPA: Justiciability and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 999 (1993); Jonathan Weems, A Proposal for Federal Genetic
Privacy Act, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 125 (2003)) (discussing NEPA’s reduced
effectiveness).
241. See id. at 186 (outlining future problems concerning agency conduct).
242. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1090 (explaining how Hopper court ruled).
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mitigation methods, and the court ordered that FWS complete a
new incidental take statement that properly considered the meth-
ods suggested by the Plaintiffs.243  An ESA violation resulted in
Cape Wind possibly adopting a future mitigation method.244  This
ultimately furthers the ESA’s goal of protecting endangered species
from harm.245  In contrast, a NEPA violation resulted in Cape Wind
moving forward once BOEM incorporated a geological survey into
the EIS.246  Ultimately, agencies may lose incentives to follow NEPA
procedures if remedies for violations are limited.247  This limitation
makes it more difficult for NEPA to accomplish one of its major
goals, namely, “[ ] deter[ing] damage to the environment[.]”248
B. Courts Assume Only One Violation Per Agency
Another concern about NEPA effectiveness arises when a court
presumes an agency will both use appropriate behavior and follow a
judicial ruling after a violation.249  In its introduction, NEPA states
that one of its primary goals is for an agency to perform an inde-
pendent analysis of environmental consequences.250  In Hopper, the
court found that BOEM violated NEPA, but, rather than require a
new EIS be completed by BOEM, the court only mandated BOEM
issue a revised EIS that incorporated a geological survey.251  The
court gave BOEM the discretion to use an already completed geo-
logical survey from 2012 in the revised EIS if BOEM felt it was ade-
quate.252  BOEM completed the 2012 survey after the original
survey in question, but well before the case.253
243. See id. (explaining FWS’s consequences for ESA violation).
244. See id. (providing court’s ruling).
245. See id. (describing ESA’s goal).  For a more detailed explanation of the
goals of the ESA, see supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
246. See id. at 1083-84 (comparing court’s ESA and NEPA violation remedies).
247. See Hausman, supra note 1, at 186 (detailing future of NEPA).
248. See Payne, supra note 116, at n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (West
{2012}) (illustrating problems NEPA faces).  NEPA’s weakening deterrent effect is
also demonstrated by Cape Wind in this case; Cape Wind’s website boasts of con-
tinued victories with a section dedicated to “major legal victories[.]” See Cape Wind
Wins Major Legal Victories, CAPE WIND (Mar. 14, 2014, 3:35 PM), http://
www.capewind.org/node/1709 (discussing Cape Wind’s major legal success).
249. See Cohen, supra note 117, at 202 (explaining problems with giving agen-
cies discretion).
250. See id. (citing Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000)) (de-
tailing NEPA’s goal of promoting independent environmental analysis); see also 42
U.S.C.A. § 4332(D)(iii) (West {2012}) (providing exact statute goals).
251. See Hopper, 827 F.3d at 1084 (demonstrating court give remedy).
252. See id. at n.5 (detailing court’s footnote).
253. See id. at 1084 (discussing NEPA conflict court’s footnote created).
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When a court provides an agency the discretion to decide what
is appropriate under NEPA, the independent analysis objective of
NEPA is jeopardized even after violations have occurred.254  Thus,
increased judicial oversight, rather than additional agency discre-
tion, appears to increase NEPA effectiveness.255  With the current
judicial trend that limits NEPA violation remedies, ultimately, any
NEPA effectiveness will likely come from an agency’s desire to avoid
costly litigation of prominent environmental issues, rather than
from its desire to follow NEPA.256
Nicole S. Haiem*
254. See Cohen, supra note 117, at 202 (explaining conflict agency discretion
created).
255. See id. at 203 (giving suggestion of reduced agency discretion).  Although
courts could increase NEPA’s effectiveness by limiting how much agency discretion
is given, this should be done in accordance with APA requirements. See Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West {2012}) (explaining discretion that
courts should give agencies).  The APA requires that courts give a certain amount
of discretion to agencies due to agencies inherent expertise. Id.  For a further
explanation of the APA see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
256. See Payne, supra note 116, at 372 (citing Silvia M. Riechel, Note, Govern-
ment Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
115, 119-20 (1994); Philip Michael Ferester, Article, Revitalizing the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act: Substantive Law Adaptions from NEPA’s Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 207, 227 (1992)) (discussing litigation’s deterrent effect).
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law,
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